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First, the district court noted that the sale of the equipment was insufficient to cover all of Laribee's outstanding debt to CIT. It then gave two reasons for its decision to grant summary judgment in CIT's favor. The district court construed MacDraw's unjust enrichment claim as one based on the fact that CIT took possession of and sold the Laribee equipment at a profit, without sharing any of the proceeds with MacDraw. We have observed that, "nder New York law, a plaintiff seeking an equitable recovery based on unjust enrichment must first show that a benefit was conferred upon the defendant, and then show that as between the two parties enrichment of the defendant was unjust." Reprosystem, 727 F.2d at 263 (2d Cir.New York Institute of Technology, 94 F.3d 830, 835 (2d Cir. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. MacDraw's first claim is that the findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting Judge Chin's grant of judgment pursuant to Rule 52(c) are clearly erroneous.Such a judgment shall be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law.
#MAC DRAW EXPRESS TRIAL#
Rule 52(c) provides in pertinent part that "f during a trial without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue, or the court may decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.The background information pertinent to this appeal is as follows. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc., 138 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. CIT Group Equipment Financing, Inc., 73 F.3d 1253 (2d Cir. The factual background and procedural history of this matter are set forth in two previous opinions of this Court, with which we assume familiarity.To prevail on its claim of promissory estoppel, MacDraw had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) a clear and unambiguous promise made by CIT, (2) upon which MacDraw reasonably and foreseeably relied, and (3) proximately resulting in injury to MacDraw by reason of its reliance. To prevail on its claim of common law fraud, MacDraw had to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a material, false representation by CIT, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity and (3) an intent to defraud, (4) upon which MacDraw reasonably relied, (5) causing MacDraw damage. As noted above, the only claims remaining to be tried before Judge Chin were for fraud and for promissory estoppel.Accordingly, the cause of action of unjust enrichment was presumptively unavailable to MacDraw. Co., 516 N.E.2d 190, 193 (NY 1987)) see also Restatement of Restitution ยง 110 (1937) ("A person who has conferred a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of performance by the third person.") Here, the written "Vendor's Consent and Agreement" entered into between Laribee and MacDraw explicitly provided that CIT did not assume any of Laribee's obligations under the purchase orders with MacDraw. US West Communications Services, Inc., 38 F.3d 1289, 1296 (2d Cir. First, "`the existence of a valid and enforceable written contract governing a particular subject matter ordinarily precludes recovery in quasi contract for events arising out of the same subject matter.'" U.S. As an initial matter, well-settled principles of New York law would ordinarily preclude MacDraw from pursuing an unjust enrichment claim against CIT under the circumstances presented here.The burden to explain a delay is on the party that seeks leave to amend.
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178, 182 (1962), the district court plainly has discretion to deny leave to amend "where the motion is made after an inordinate delay, no satisfactory explanation is made for the delay, and the amendment would prejudice the defendant." Cresswell v. Although permission to amend should be freely granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. We review a denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion.